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Abstract
The paper outlines the role that tacit knowledge plays in what might seem to be an area of
knowledge that can be made fully explicit or codified and which forms a central element of Evidence
Based Medicine. Appeal to the role the role of tacit knowledge in science provides a way to unify
the tripartite definition of Evidence Based Medicine given by Sackett et al: the integration of best
research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. Each of these three elements, crucially
including research evidence, rests on an ineliminable and irreducible notion of uncodified good
judgement.
The paper focuses on research evidence, drawing first on the work of Kuhn to suggest that tacit
knowledge contributes, as a matter of fact, to puzzle solving within what he calls normal science.
A stronger argument that it must play a role in research is first motivated by looking to Collins' first
hand account of replication in applied physics and then broader considerations of replication in
justifying knowledge claims in scientific research. Finally, consideration of an argument from
Wittgenstein shows that whatever explicit guidelines can be drawn up to guide judgement the
specification of what counts as correctly following them has to remain implicit.
Overall, the paper sets out arguments for the claim that even though explicit guidelines and
codifications can play a practical role in informing clinical practice, they rest on a body of tacit or
implicit skill that is in principle ineliminable. It forms the bedrock of good judgement and unites the
integration of research, expertise and values.
Introduction
In their book, Evidence-based Medicine: How to practice and
teach EBM, David Sackett, Sharon Straus, Scott Richard-
son, William Rosenberg, and Brian Haynes define it as fol-
lows. 'Evidence based medicine is the integration of best
research evidence with clinical expertise and patient val-
ues.' [1]
This is a surprising definition. Normally, the focus of EBM
is on the first element of that tripartite division: best
research evidence. But Sackett et al widen their definition
to include two further aspects: expertise and values. They
give a further brief preliminary sketch of each as follows.
By  best research evidence we mean clinically relevant
research... New evidence from clinical research and treat-
ments both invalidates previously accepted diagnostic
tests and treatments and replaces them with new ones that
are more powerful, more accurate, more efficacious and
safer.
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By clinical expertise we mean the ability to use our clinical
skills and past experience to rapidly identify each patient's
unique health state and diagnosis, their individual risks
and benefits of potential interventions, and their personal
values and expectations.
By patient values we mean the unique preferences, con-
cerns and expectations each patient brings to a clinical
encounter and which must be integrated into clinical deci-
sions if they are to serve the patient. [1]
Two preliminary points are worth making about this sub-
stantial overall definition. Firstly, it looks to be a defini-
tion of what would normally be taken to be, not EBM as
such, but something that should be based on it: best clin-
ical practice, perhaps, or clinical judgement.
Secondly, it can seem that these three elements do not
form a unifiable whole, and thus the proper subject for an
attempt at unified definition. Of course, to take the first
element, being research evidence-based does not preclude
a judgement being based on other things as well. An evi-
dence-base and a values-base can go hand in hand in
informing patient centred clinical judgement. But to
either an unschooled eye, or to an eye overly schooled in
positivistic models of scientific method, the three ele-
ments may look disparate for a specific reason.
One of the thrusts of EBM is to promote the use of good
quality reliable evidence through hierarchies which put
meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials at the top,
descriptive studies lower down and respected authority
(radically) at the bottom. This is an attempt to codify or
apply explicit rules to judgements about evidence. By con-
trast, clinical expertise is not codifiable. It depends instead
on skilled judgement drawing on personal experience.
Judgements about patient values may or may not seem to
be codifiable depending on the view one takes of their
nature. If one assumes both that the relevant values are
exhausted by moral or ethical values and also that such
values can be codified in principles (one adopts a 'princi-
plist' approach) then one may think of the third aspect in
just the same algorithmic way as a positivist takes the first
(and thus unlike the second). Skill in following medical
ethical values, on this view, is an algorithmic skill in
deduction from general principles.
A more sophisticated view, however, recognises that ethi-
cal values are just one sub-set of the values that need to be
taken into account in clinical judgement. Vales Based
Practice, on this alternative view, should take into account
the preferences, likes and dislikes of stakeholders in a
judgement, aiming to balance opposing claims rather
than assuming that an ideal solution exists [2]. If so, it
looks more like the second aspect of EBM, clinical exper-
tise, and unlike the first, research evidence.
But even on the mistakenly narrow assumption that only
ethical values are important, it is arguable that any ethical
principles that do hold only hold – in accord with Aristo-
tle's views -for the most part. It is not possible to draw up
a list of principles that are both contentful – ie can actually
guide medical practice – and are mutually consistent. But
if this is not possible then ethical judgements are not sim-
ply rule or principle driven. Some other factor must be in
play in, eg, selecting which principle is most important in
each different context which is not codified in the princi-
ples themselves [3].
It is worth considering values a little further because this
will reveal an assumption that is relevant to broader con-
sideration of tacit knowledge. One motivation for assum-
ing that ethical values can be codified in a set of principles
is, according to the philosopher John McDowell, an
assumption or prejudice about the nature of rationality in
general [4,5]. He suggests that Aristotle's otherwise obvi-
ous truth about the uncodifibaility of moral judgement is
missed because of this. A comparison with a paradigmat-
ically  codified  judgement should help make this clear.
Consider a simple mathematical series such as counting
up in two's. McDowell suggests that we tend to think of
competence in continuing such a series as resulting from
a psychological mechanism, an internal state, which reli-
ably delivers the right result at each point. Because of this
we expect codifications elsewhere, as well. But in fact it is
a mistake to think that a psychological mechanism could
explain why just the right numbers – out of the multitude
of wrong numbers – are given for an infinite series.
The natural but mistaken picture can also be augmented,
especially in mathematical cases, with the idea that the
mechanism tracks or follows objective, perhaps supernat-
ural, rails which are already out there, independently of
us. Our continuing a series is, to use another metaphor,
merely going over, in bolder pencil, moves already some-
how made. This serves as a model of what objectivity
amounts to. In medical, rather than mathematical, cases
the reality is a little more straight-forward. Rather than
tracking supernatural mathematical facts, objective medi-
cal judgements aim at validity: tracking real distinctions in
our physiological nature or the nature of diseases.
With this assumption in place, it seems that the making of
any genuinely objective judgement could be codified.
Schematically, judgements involve applying a concept to
a subject. Thus it seems that they ought to be codifiable by
giving a principle or formula 'that specifies the conditions
under which the concept, in the use of it that one has mas-
tered, is correctly applied' [6]. This is a mistaken viewPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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which leads in turn to the assumption that all genuinely
cognitive judgements must be governed by an explicit
rule.
Now it is only this misconception of the deductive
paradigm that leads us to suppose that the operations
of any specific conception of rationality in a particular
area – any specific conception of what counts as doing
the same thing – must be deductively explicable; that
is, that there must be a formulable universal princi-
ple... [6]
In other words, the view one takes of ethical judgements
depends on one's view of their objectivity against a back-
ground assumption that, where there is objectivity, a cod-
ification or explicit rule for the corresponding judgement
is possible. If one takes value judgements to be codifiable
in this way, alongside research or evidence-based judge-
ments, only clinical expertise, of Sackett's tripartite defini-
tion, resists explicit codification, almost by its definition.
But one common interpretation of EBM is precisely to dis-
count the contribution of expertise for that reason. What
cannot be codified cannot be a proper exercise of ration-
ality, is not an objective matter. (I will return to Wittgen-
stein's and McDowell's diagnosis of the mistake at the end
of this paper.)
Whatever the view of value judgements, the evidence base
of medicine is often taken to involve a particularly robust
kind of rational judgement: judgement that can be codi-
fied in rules or guidelines. This reflects the widespread
view that research is based on a scientific method that is
itself explicit or codifiable. Once this assumption is in
place, any aspect of clinical practice that cannot be so cod-
ified can seem arbitrary or subjective in comparison. This
in turn suggests that the three aspects that make up Sack-
ett's complex view of EBM cannot be unified. They differ
fundamentally.
But this view of the immiscibility of the elements can be
resisted, not by attempting to assimilate expertise to the
positivistic model of research evidence and the principlist
model of ethical judgements, but the other way round. In
this paper, I will outline a principled reason for this
approach by outlining a role for tacit knowledge in scien-
tific practice including its role in research. This will under-
mine the view of evidence-based judgement as
algorithmic and thus help undermine the comparison
that that idea motivates. Without that view, clinical prac-
tice can be seen as unified through the idea that all three
elements of Sackett's composite rest on uncodifiable
judgement. Practical rationality rests on a kind of cogni-
tive skill: judgement in the sense 'judgement' has in the
phrase 'having good judgement'.
The discussion will draw on the history of science, the
social study of scientific knowledge and pure philosophy.
In so doing this example nicely illustrates the insight the
humanities in general, and philosophy in particular, can
shed on medicine. (The important traffic in the opposite
direction will not be discussed here.)
Kuhn's account of tacit knowledge
Although the term was first popularised by Michael
Polanyi, an influential first clue to the role of tacit knowl-
edge in EBM can be found in Thomas Kuhn's Structure of
Scientific Revolutions [7,8]. On his familiar account, the
practice of science as a whole comprises lengthy periods of
'normal science' punctuated by occasional, briefer periods
of revolutionary change. Most scientists, for most of the
time, are thus engaged in the activities that make up nor-
mal science.
Kuhn suggests that the main activity of normal science is
'puzzle solving' which he compares to crossword and jig-
saw puzzles. Like those everyday cases, Kuhnian puzzles
are assumed to be soluble and the nature of the solutions
sought is highly circumscribed, in this case by the domi-
nant theoretical background. Solving them is thus not a
matter of great surprise but rather serves as a test of the
theoretical or experimental prowess of the scientist in
question. It also serves to extend and make more explicit
the overall background set of theories and high level met-
aphysical assumptions which, inter alia, Kuhn labels 'par-
adigms'. Puzzles which mattered to previous paradigms,
by contrast, may be rejected as the product of bad science
or bad metaphysics or they may simply be ignored until a
subsequent revolutionary change makes them into impor-
tant puzzles again.
Kuhn goes on to suggest that puzzle solving highlights the
role of tacit knowledge in theoretical science. One of the
central skills which is acquired by puzzle solving is learn-
ing to recognise how to apply the background theories to
new cases, what assumptions or approximations count as
reasonable, what would constitute a satisfactory solution,
and so forth. In other words, possession of explicit knowl-
edge of a regimented theory is insufficient to be counted
as a competent scientist. One must also have the 'know-
how' required to apply high level theories to particular
cases. A key element of this is to recognise that apparently
different puzzles can in fact be treated in the same or anal-
ogous ways.
That is only one of the ways in which scientific research
work is guided by tacit knowledge. Kuhn also suggests that
scientific work is guided by a set of underlying assump-
tions or commitments in four ways:Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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• At a practical level, research is guided by commitments
to particular kinds of instrument, experiment or tests.
• Laws and theories...
• ... and higher level meta-theoretical or metaphysical
assumptions determine what is taken to be the subject of
science, what sort of thing there is – atoms in a plenum or
fields of force – and thus the sort of account to be devel-
oped.
• Finally, the values which are constitutive of being a sci-
entist: weight placed on rationality, coherence, quantifica-
tion, observation and measurement.
It might seem that these commitments are imposed upon
scientists working within a particular tradition in the form
of explicit rules or codes. But Kuhn argues that they are, in
fact, implicit or tacit. He provides two main arguments for
this claim. The first is empirical. Historical inquiry has
simply failed to discover evidence of sufficient numbers of
explicit rules to explain the coherence of scientific tradi-
tions. Therefore the rules must be implicit. (Note, by the
way, that Kuhn himself reserves the word 'rule' for explicit
rules.)
Secondly, Kuhn suggests why it might be that the rules are
implicit. Much scientific training, from its beginnings in
school-work to PhD level and beyond, is by example and
application. Terms are introduced together with the theo-
retical context in which they have their life. Theories are
introduced alongside applications in the solution of prob-
lems or puzzles. Most of a scientific education comprises
learning how to apply theories to problems. If these 'fin-
ger exercises' are successful, a trainee scientist learns to see
similarities between cases which permit the application of
familiar puzzle solving techniques. But this does not
require that he or she has abstracted an explicit rule about
what it is that makes cases similar except that the same sort
of solution can be applied.
Kuhn's account of science as a whole echoes the practical
aspect of medical training. What the account adds, how-
ever, is an emphasis on the role of tacit knowledge not
only in practical contexts – the application of medical the-
ory on wards or general practice surgeries from the recog-
nition of symptoms to the formulation of management
plans – but also in furthering the research findings of sci-
entific paradigms.
Although this account of the role of tacit knowledge in sci-
ence is suggestive, it is limited in two related respects.
Firstly, the most it seems to offer is a claim to the effect
that, as a matter of fact or as science is presently practiced,
tacit knowledge is involved. This contrasts with a stronger
claim that tacit knowledge must be involved. Thus it might
be thought that this is reason itself to regulate or codify
practice through, eg, the sort of guidelines that make up
EBM. But, although such guidelines can be useful, this is
only in a context of practical know-how. Or so I shall
argue.
Secondly, although Kuhn suggests that 'finger exercises'
are important in the account of tacit knowledge, he does
not provide a deep account of why this rules out explicit
knowledge. Could the knowledge that, as a matter of fact,
is transmitted through finger exercises be fully codified, in
principle, in explicit guidelines? To remedy both these
lacks I will turn in the next section first to the example of
cookery and thence to another piece of empirical analysis,
this time by a sociologist of knowledge, Harry Collins.
Tacit knowledge in cookery and engineering 
science
In his book Changing Order: Replication and Induction in
Scientific Practice, Harry Collins charts the role of tacit
knowledge in both scientific and extra-scientific practice
(eg parapsychology). As I will describe below, the idea of
replication plays a central role in underpinning research
evidence. Replication is a practical response to the princi-
pled problem of how one can learn from experience
through induction and thus lies at the heart of EBM. But
the role of tacit knowledge in that broader context can be
seen more clearly by looking to a more concrete case of
replication that Collins also discusses: replicating a new
kind of laser. That discussion, however, can itself be clari-
fied by starting this section with an everyday case: basic
cookery.
By basic cookery I mean the kind of culinary skills
acquired through both formal home economics teaching
and informal apprenticeship in the home. It is the level of
cookery involved in making cakes, baking bread, roasting
or casseroling meat, making pancakes, scrambling eggs
etc. Basic cookery is a theory-informed practical skill with
normative standards. It has normative standards in the
sense that it is possible to get it wrong. One can fail to
cause a cake to rise, fail to roast chicken such that it is
cooked on the inside without burning the outside, fail to
mix batter of the right consistency that resultant pancakes
have sufficient structural integrity. Even given the vagaries
of taste, there are still culinary standards to aim for. (The
additional skills of great chefs, by contrast, do not seem to
be subject to such clear cut norms. This may be because
such chefs are as much responsible for changing standards
of taste as answering to them.)
As well as answering to normative standards, basic cook-
ery involves both a body of practical skill and of explicit
theory. The theory includes, eg, relative proportions ofPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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ingredients for the mixing of batter; cooking times, for a
fixed temperature, as a function of weight of poultry; the
correct appearance of molten butter for scrambling eggs
etc. At their most practical, skills include how to whisk egg
whites, to toss pancakes, assess whether a cake is cooked
on the inside by piercing it with a skewer etc. What then is
the relation between these different aspects of basic cook-
ery? Does cookery depend on tacit knowledge and, if so,
must it?
Most people have had the experience of attempting to fol-
low a recipe, attending to each stage of the process, and yet
failing to obtain the desired and predicted result, failing
the relevant normative standard. Why is this? One possi-
bility is a breakdown of the practical skills involved. Per-
haps the cook lacks, eg, the physical strength or dexterity
to whisk the mixture at sufficient speed. In most cases,
however, especially given the mechanisation of even
domestic cookery, this is not the cause of the problem. But
on the – fallible – assumption that none of the explicit
instructions has been violated what other explanation is
there?
The most obvious explanation is that the recipe is incom-
plete. Perhaps a key step has been omitted even if it is one
that would not need to be explicitly stated for a skilled
cook (which perhaps explains its omission by its skilled
author). Such a cook can 'fill in' the missing step unthink-
ingly whereas the novice comes unstuck. Tacit knowledge
fits this picture as an abbreviation of explicit knowledge.
But would it be possible to make all such knowledge
explicit? In the UK, one particular cook, Delia Smith, is
famous for her attempt to make culinary skill as explicit as
possible in both books and television programmes.
According to her How to Cook, there are, for example, nine
stages in making a piece of toast (merely the seventh of
which is to eat the toast as soon as possible) [9]. But, aside
from the merely practical skills, could this approach
remove all need of tacit knowledge? Could all knowledge
be explicit?
Harry Collins, a sociologist of knowledge, addresses this
question in his discussion of a case drawn from applied
physics, or theoretical engineering. The example concerns
the practical difficulties of scientific replication. In this
case, 'replication' is quite literal. Collins describes an
attempt to build a working laser which, although of a new
design (a Transversely Excited Atmospheric pressure CO2,
or TEA, laser), had already been successfully tested
through the construction of working versions in other lab-
oratories. The challenge is to build another one. In one
case, a scientist who has already built one working model
aims to replicate it so as to have two working models.
Despite this limited problem – a clear case of Kuhnian
'normal science' – and despite the availability of explicit
instructions, Collins discovered a surprising difficulty.
[N]o scientist succeeded in building a laser by using
only information found in published or other written
sources. Thus every scientist who managed to copy the
laser obtained a crucial component of the requisite
knowledge from personal contact and discussion. A
second point is that no scientist succeeded in building
a TEA-laser where the informant was a 'middle man'
who had not built a device himself. The third point is
that even where the informant had built a successful
device, and where information flowed freely as far as
could be seen, the learner would be unlikely to suc-
ceed without some extended period of contact with
the informant and, in some cases, would not succeed
at all...
In sum, the flow of knowledge was such that, first, it
travelled only where there was personal contact with
an accomplished practitioner; second, its passage was
invisible so that scientists did not know whether they
had the relevant expertise to build a laser until they
tried it; and, third, it was so capricious that similar
relationships between teacher and learner might or
might not result in the transfer of knowledge. These
characteristics of the flow of knowledge make sense if
a crucial component in laser building ability is 'tacit
knowledge'. [10]
Why might this be so? Aside from the empirical claim that
this was simply what he found, Collins' detailed first hand
account of one scientist's (Dr Bob Harrison's) progress
contains some general lessons.
The problem scientists confront in such cases is this.
Assembling a complex arrangement of component parts,
even given the constraint of accord with physical theory,
does not usually at first produce a working machine. If the
whole machine does not work this must be because at
least one of the components does not work or is con-
nected wrongly into the whole. But in general, the only
direct test of whether a component is itself working prop-
erly is its contribution to a working overall assembly,
which is in turn impossible until all the components are
working. Likewise, the test that any is connected properly
is, ultimately, that all are correctly connected in the work-
ing machine. Collins refers to this problem as the 'Experi-
menters' Regress'. In the area of science that Collins
discusses which is a mixture of mature and developing sci-
ence (many components of the lasers are 'off the shelf',
others have to be specifically made by the scientists),
building instruments to test laser components would be
possible. But such instruments would themselves be com-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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plex devices, mimicking or replicating the environment of
the component in the laser.
Given the Experimenters' Regress, there is no simple pro-
cedure for 'debugging' the apparatus. It might be thought
that the solution to the problem of debugging lies in
avoiding it by carefully following published accounts. But
Collins gives reason to think that these cannot be suffi-
cient. Published explicit guidelines underdetermine the
range of judgements that need to be made. In the case of
replicating a working laser, there is what looks to be the
most explicit guidance possible. Rather than following
written instructions – which stand in for, by symbolically
representing, a working laser – there is, instead, a real laser
to copy. But to copy even this involves judgements of rel-
evant similarity and dissimilarity between the original
and the copy.
Throughout, Bob Harrison [the scientist] and I had
been discussing similarities and differences between
the old and new laser. I had noticed the different thick-
ness of the wires and had suggested that this might be
significant. One of the graduate students had agreed
that the thinner wires would have a significantly
reduced surface area which might prevent proper pre-
ionization. Yet Harrison had failed to see this as a sig-
nificant difference; as it turned out his not seeing the
difference was the proper way to see things. They were
in fact 'just wires'... There were other differences I
noticed and that Harrison ignored, quite rightly as it
turned out... Without knowing how to ignore all these
things we might have spent months checking them
out... None of the things that Harrison had learned to
ignore would be obviously significant, or insignifi-
cant, on a circuit diagram or in a technical article. The
range of things to be ignored is, of course, indefinitely
long. On the other hand, in developing his laser build-
ing skill Harrison had also learned to see significance
where previously he had noticed nothing. [11]
In a practical example of replication like this, the number
of differences between the original and the copy is likely
to be high. But Collins indicates a further, principled,
source of complexity: the number of factors that can safely
be ignored or are not critical. In the case of copying a
working laser, this list is not written down anywhere. The
rule is simply to copy the original. But if it were written
down it would, in principle, have to include an infinite
number of factors. Thus explicit knowledge of it looks to
be impossible. Any statement of Harrison's knowledge –
once he has acquired laser-building skill – of such factors,
on which he does not waste time, will be inadequate.
In the case at hand, however, it might seem that such a list
is unnecessary. If replication of a laser is a matter of mak-
ing an exact copy, then there is no need for that further
specification. But this raises a more general question of
the role of replication in science which will be significant
for assessing the role of tacit knowledge in research evi-
dence. In general, in science what matters is not exact rep-
lication but replication of relevant factors to which I will
now turn.
The broader role of replication in underpinning 
scientific objectivity
This point can first be illustrated by considering the rela-
tion between cookery books and television programmes.
Consider Delia Smith's nine step programme for making
toast. In line with Collins' discussion, even her careful
statement of the process omits a complete list of factors
that are not critical but misguided attention to which
would stop the process before it began. In general in cook-
ery, knowledge of what is not critical is an important
aspect of culinary knowledge. In making pastry, the tem-
perature of the hands and the work top are significant. In
preparing a casserole, they are not. Neither, however, are
an infinite number of other factors, such as the colour of
one's clothes or hair, the phase of the moon etc. Knowing
what factors generalise from one process to another and
what do not is thus important but is not fully explicit in
any cookery manual.
In the face of this challenge, one might retreat to a model
of exact copying and turn to the television recordings of
Delia Smith actually cooking to preserve an algorithmic
model of expertise. Surely, if one mechanically reproduces
exactly each stage of the cooking process so recorded one
will produce the same degree of success. This assumption
is based on a form of supervenience. If culinary results
supervene on microphysical properties, then exactly repli-
cating microphysical properties will exactly replicate culi-
nary results.
But consider a practical cookery examination. If a student
insists on replicating not only the essential steps in a rec-
ipe but also, without discrimination, Smith's choice of
oven, sink and kitchen units; the number and make of
prepared bowls of ingredients; Smith's style of dress; the
view through the window of her kitchen etc this will dem-
onstrate not a fine grained skill but a lack of culinary
understanding. Culinary skill involves the ability to repli-
cate all and only relevant factors, not every factor.
Collins develops this point in discussing the role of repli-
cation in science more generally [12]. Replication is a cen-
tral mark of scientific objectivity. In medicine, it lies at the
heart of the emphasis on large scale randomised control-
led trials and on meta analysis of RCT's. But, as he points
out, there are important constraints on what counts as
replication.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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If there is too close a similarity between one trial and
another, then the second does not count as adding evi-
dential weight to the first. If the same scientist takes a sec-
ond reading from an experimental apparatus a second or
two after the first, this does not count as independent con-
firmation of the first. The test is better if carried out by a
different scientist, at a different time, in a different labora-
tory and so forth. Increasing the differences increases, ini-
tially at least, the importance of the replication. But if the
'replication' is carried out by a non-scientist reading tea-
leaves then this is a difference too far and again, it does
not add evidential weight. Successful evidence-building
replication is a compromise between these opposing fac-
tors.
Given this, however, evidence-supporting replication is,
like culinary skill, a matter of copying relevant factors not
exact details. Whilst it is easy to loose sight of this once
one ascends to the level of meta-analysis of large scale tri-
als, each individual trial is a kind of experiment and, like
the replication of the laser, is an achievement that
depends on the controlled deployment of tacit knowl-
edge. Each new trial must be sufficiently like, and suffi-
ciently unlike, the trials that precede it.
The examples drawn from cookery and from applied
physics suggest a key role for tacit knowledge. It is not,
however, merely the kind of practical know-how involved
in dexterous manipulation of the environment. (This is
not to play down the role of such know-how in clinical
practice.) Rather, even the most cognitive aspects of scien-
tific process turn on tacit knowledge.
A principled argument for tacit knowledge
The considerations so far have suggested piecemeal argu-
ments for the presence of tacit knowledge in science. But
there is stronger argument drawn from Wittgenstein to
which I will turn. (Collins also invokes Wittgenstein but
to make a distinct claim about the social nature of sci-
ence.)
Recall the assumption that all genuinely cognitive judge-
ments must be governed by an explicit rule and thus that
anything which fails to pass this test is not a case of genu-
ine concept application or valid judgement. This line of
argument rests on a mistake, however. It goes wrong in the
assumption that it is necessary, or even helpful, to postu-
late a psychological mechanism to explain an ability to
follow a rule. Postulating such a state of mind is an idle
wheel because it cannot ground the kind of expectation
that either we, or other people, will continue in the same
(successful) way.
In an influential central section of his Philosophical Investi-
gations, Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses rule following in
detail. Taking the case of continuing a mathematical
series, he considers how it is possible to teach or to learn
how to go on correctly, given the infinite nature of the
task. Consider the problem of ascribing knowledge of the
correct continuation to another person. Given the infinite
number of variations in principle available at some higher
number (eg responding to the instruction "add 2" by con-
tinuing 996, 998, 1000, but then 1004, 1008 etc) it may
seem epistemically risky to ascribe shared understanding
of the correct continuation on the basis of finite past prac-
tice. Hence the temptation to ascribe a psychological
mechanism to explain the ability and thus narrow down
the range of future moves.
As Wittgenstein shows, however, if inferring from finite
past to future practice were not reliable in itself, postulat-
ing the intervening mechanism would not help either.
Past practice, once described as mere inductive evidence
for a mechanism, could be evidence for any number of
diverging mechanisms. Any finite number of examples
might be interpreted to be in accord with an infinite
number of possible continuations. It is easiest to think of
this in the case of a third person ascription to another. But
there are similar problems in the first person case as well
in ensuring that one embodies just the right mechanism
oneself.
In both cases, the felt need for an interpretation leads to a
vicious regress. In the former case, other people's past
practice has to be interpreted as following a particular
rule. In the latter, one's own mental states, mental signs or
processes have to be interpreted as determining a rule.
Hence Wittgenstein concludes:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be
determined by a rule, because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer
was: if everything can be made out to accord with the
rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict
here. It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding
here from the mere fact that in the course of our argu-
ment we give one interpretation after another; as if
each one contented us at least for a moment, until we
thought of yet another standing behind it. What this
shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is
not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we
call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual
cases. [13]
A key move to avoid the problem turns on rejecting the
view of theory neutral evidence for another person's grasp
of a rule. Instead, as long as one adopts the same perspec-
tive then one can see in the practice the rule that is exem-
plified. That we are able to adopt the same perspectivePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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depends on the fact that we share the same 'whirl of
organism', in Stanley Cavell's memorable phrase [14].
Thus even judgements that can be codified such as contin-
uing a mathematical series rest on tacit knowledge. What
then should be said about hard cases: judgements that are
not codified? Under the grip of the prejudice that Wittgen-
stein exposes, one might assume that either there is a piece
of knowledge that could in principle be articulated or it is
not a case of conceptual judgement. But since the proper
understanding of even codifiable judgement shows that
what is primitive is a notion of going on in the same way
which cannot be explained as the result of a mechanism,
the contrast between the two cases is diminished. One
way of putting this point is to suggest an equivalence
between a hard case for uncodifiable judgement and what
could be said if someone were to question how to apply
the series add 2 at the point at which, in Wittgenstein's
phrase, justifications have come to an end. ('Giving
grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an
end; – but the end is not certain propositions' striking us
immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our
part; it is our acting which lies at the bottom of the lan-
guage game' [15])
Drawing on Wittgenstein's discussion, McDowell suggests
that the model of uncodified conceptual judgement is
this:
We are inclined to be impressed by the sparseness of
the teaching that leaves someone capable of autono-
mously going on in the same way. All that happens is
that the pupil is told, or shown, what to do in a few
instances, with some surrounding talk about why that
is the thing to do; the surrounding talk, ex hypothesi...
falls short of including actual enunciation of a univer-
sal principle, mechanical application of which would
constitute correct behaviour in the practice in ques-
tion. Yet pupils do acquire a capacity to go on, without
further advice, to novel instances. Impressed by the
sparseness of the teaching, we find this remarkable.
[16]
If there is no universal principle then it can seem miracu-
lous that finite teaching enables students to go on in the
same way. But this is a misleading contrast because if there
is a universal principle, it would be equally miraculous
how they grasp the right principle from finite teaching.
The moral of Wittgenstein's discussion of rules in this case
is this. Given that discussion, even in the case of judge-
ments for which a universal principle can be written
down, the ability to apply the principle depends on our
basic responses to it. Justifications for particular responses
to a rule come to an end. Fortunately because humans
share the same basic reactions, responses, routes of sali-
ence and so on, they typically come to an end in agree-
ment. But this makes the idea that there are uncodifiable
judgements innocuous. Both codified and uncodified
judgements are, ultimately, in the same boat. Both
depend on a tacit element.
Wittgenstein's discussion thus provides a powerful argu-
ment about the role of tacit knowledge in judgement. At
the heart of explicit codified knowledge is judgement in
accordance with rules. But whatever can made explicit in
specifying what does and what does not accord with a rule
must itself inevitably rest on something implicit and tacit.
(The later Wittgenstein is not the only source for princi-
pled arguments for the role of tacit knowledge. Other
sources include the early Heidegger and more recent phe-
nomenology, which is particularly resonant for issues in
mental health care, as well as arguments for moral partic-
ularism drawing on Aristotle.)
Tacit knowledge and explicit guidelines in 
medical research and practice
I have argued that research drawn from the history of sci-
ence, the sociology of science and pure philosophy shows
that there is an element of tacit knowledge, of practical
know-how, underpinning the most explicitly codified ele-
ments of EBM: research evidence driven by scientific
method. Arguments drawn from Collins' analysis of
empirical replication and the argument from Wittgen-
stein's consideration of rule governed judgement show
that such tacit knowledge is in principle ineliminable.
This is not to say, however, that codifications can play no
useful practical roles. Consider, for example, the guide-
lines set out by Pocock on clinical trials in his Clinical Tri-
als: A Practical Approach. He stipulates that trials should be:
comparative. The experiences of patients on the treatment
under trial are compared with a control group: the experi-
ences of patients on other treatments (possibly including
no treatment).
randomized. This is supposed to prevent conclusions
being drawn about the effects of drug treatments, for
example, which are really the effects of some other uncon-
trolled for factor present in the sample.
double blind, wherever possible. Neither the patients nor
the clinicians testing results should know whether they
belong to the test group or control group.
Aside from these general features, Pocock claims that clin-
ical trials should proceed through a pre-determined series
of steps 'if the principles of scientific method are to be fol-
lowed' [17]. Those steps are:Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:2 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/2
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1. Define the purpose of the trial: state specific hypothe-
ses.
2. Design the trial: a written protocol.
3. Conduct the trial: a good organisation.
4. Analyse the data: descriptive statistics, tests of hypothe-
ses.
5. Draw conclusions: publish results
These are useful instructions and the emphasis on rand-
omized comparative and double blind trials fits with
EBM.
The account of scientific method, though clearly only
describing a small element of scientific practice, might
also be a useful summary of the current phase of medical
'normal science'. But it is a useful summary only for some-
one able to follow it. Point 2 may be a useful corrective for
anyone unused to having to 'show their workings'. Point
3: 'conduct the trial', gnomically summarises in three
words Bob Harrison's lengthy struggles as set out by Col-
lins. Point 4 omits an account of how  to analyse data
which might take more than one university course. Point
5 omits the further efforts involved in genuinely publish-
ing results described by Collins: the personal contact and
instruction and shared experience of working experimen-
tal setups etc.
Two general points are worth noting here. First, a natural
response would be to say that this is just a brisk list of
headings and that each step can be further described
(which is precisely the aim of books such as Pocock's). But
the arguments in the rest of this paper show that whatever
is made explicit in further explanations cannot in itself be
sufficient to determine correct practice. That also requires
a shared background of tacit knowledge. Whatever is
made explicit, something is always left implicit.
Second, however, providing one does have a sufficient
background of tacit skill, even a recipe as brisk as the
above list might well be a useful reminder of the steps to
be gone through and their order. The fact that tacit knowl-
edge is a necessary element of scientific judgement does
not undermine a practical use for some codifications. But
it does suggest a principled limit to the ambition to codify
all that is involved in having good judgement.
The same general lessons apply, for example, to attempts
to codify diagnosis in general practice. Diagnosis has been
codified as a 'hypothetico-deductive' process [18]. In clin-
ical handbooks, this process is sometimes represented in
a flow diagram which starts with the inputs to the process
(clinical background knowledge, and presenting signs
and symptoms) and progresses via a list of hypotheses
that are tested against further information gathering
resulting in a plan for medical management. Such flow
charts can be useful prompts or reminders but this is not
because they fully capture diagnostic expertise in tem-
selves. The boxes describing the inputs of background
medical knowledge and patient signs and symptoms have
to be interpreted in the light of clinical skill and experi-
ence. How much is enough background medical knowl-
edge? How many degrees should one take? How long
should one give a patient to describe symptoms? How
many possible hypotheses should be actively considered
at each stage? Practical teaching helps fill in the answers to
these questions whether by prompting an explicit answer
(eg suggesting a range of 3–5 hypotheses) or implicitly
guiding practice (eg the skilled clinician can judge how
much time different patients in context), or by ruling out
an inquiry that could be raised (eg simply silencing a
potential worry about the number of medical degrees
required).
In a context of such background tacit knowledge, filling in
the gaps in the codification becomes second nature. But
whilst this may disguise the role of tacit knowledge it does
not eliminate its need. Providing they are interpreted
intelligently, diagrammatic codifications can be helpful
guides to practice. What they cannot do, however, is cap-
ture good clinical judgement independently of the tacit
background. In themselves they remain merely partial and
schematic codifications of practice.
Conclusion
The model of judgement as an uncodified exercise of prac-
tical rationality provides a way to unify Sackett et al's tri-
partite broader definition of EBM as the integration of
best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient
values. Whilst it is tempting to contrast the explicit knowl-
edge-base of research evidence with the implicit skills of
clinical expertise – downplayed by most accounts of EBM
– and the necessary judgement involved in balancing
opposing values in Values-Based Practice (when properly
understood), all depend on an ability to exercise judge-
ment. This is so even though it is often hidden by skill and
practice.
In fairness, the best accounts of the practice of EBM do not
present even the research evidence element as algorithmic
(a good short account is [19]). The problem, however, is
that this tends to be forgotten in the face of the prejudice
about rationality I outlined at the start of this paper. In
practice, in other words, the need for judgement is down-
played in the face of rising numbers of explicit guidelines
and codifications setting out good practice.Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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In this respect, EBM resembles the version of principlism
in medical ethics set out by Beauchamp and Childress. In
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress
stress the need for judgement in the application of the
principles they set out [20]. In practice, however, despite
the intentions of its authors, the Four Principles Approach
to medical ethics can quickly seem to promise an algorith-
mic model of ethical competence []. In part this is because
insufficient attention is paid to how ethical judgements
might not be fully codified in principles and yet still be an
exercise of objectivity and rationality.
In a similar way, despite the emphasis on the role of
judgement in EBM by some authors, it can drop from view
when presented with the sheer weight of trial numbers
summarised in a Cochrane review. But by looking back at
the hidden details of scientific process behind that data
and by reflecting on what is involved in correctly follow-
ing explicit rules in applying it in context, the fundamen-
tal role of tacit knowledge can be brought to view again.
There is an ineliminable role for uncodified and tacit
knowledge, or judgement, behind even explicit research
evidence. Tacit knowledge serves to unify all three of Sack-
ett's tripartite articulation of EBM. In a slogan, at the heart
of evidence based medicine is good judgement.
One further connection is worth making. The main claim
of this paper, that even explicit research-driven evidence-
based medicine rests on a background of implicit or tacit
knowledge, has echoes with another general change in
theoretical orientation in medical practice. Emphasising
the role of tacit knowledge plays up the idea that those
who make medical judgements are not abstract rational
points of view but embodied agents who share a 'whirl of
organism'. It is this shared practical orientation that
underpins abstract conceptual judgement and reliability
between different clinicians.
This parallels another influential recent idea: the rise of
the importance of user centred care. User centred care con-
trasts with an over concentration on symptoms consid-
ered in isolation. The idea of user centred care also has a
philosophical analogue which is particularly germane to
mental health care which might be expressed in the slogan:
the smallest unit of meaning is the life of the whole per-
son. (This view contrasts with a focus instead on trying to
explain the meaning of either individual brain states or
mental representations through causal connections. That
reductionist programme faces severe conceptual difficul-
ties, however [21].)
The underlying metaphysics of user centred care is the
patient as a whole person, the meaning of whose life is a
structured – though in mental illness perhaps fractured –
whole. The metaphysics of tacit knowledge is one of clini-
cians as embodied whole persons exercising judgement in
the face both of complex data and guided by only partial
codifications. These two views fit together with a much
more humane account of the relation of 'subject' and
'object' in clinical judgement: a relation that will be better
understood through a contribution from philosophy and
the humanities as well as the hard sciences.
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